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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

MISSING THE MARK: AN EXAMINATION OF THE CURRENT
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE CHINESE REVERSE MERGER
DILEMMA

INTRODUCTION
In response to the divisive rule amendments adopted by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) in 2005, Aden Pavkov
depicted the conflicting messages sent by the SEC’s action.1 Observing the
differing views held by those affected by the rule amendments, Pavkov
portrayed the Commission both as a “vigilant constable” who slayed evilspirited public shell companies guilty of devouring private firms and as a
“nobleman-regulator” who ruthlessly deprived suffering private-company
souls from any hope of survival.2 The SEC had just made listing on the U.S.
stock markets more difficult for private companies by (1) defining “shell
company,” (2) requiring shell companies to file additional information when
completing a transaction that would cause them to lose their classification as
shell companies, and (3) instructing issuers of stock to indicate whether their
firms fell within the definition of a shell company.3 Pavkov’s clashing
metaphors properly illustrate the two discordant roles played by the SEC when
it adopted the rule amendments: on one hand, the SEC was a “vigilant
constable” since its stringent amendments rescued private companies from the
untrustworthy public companies that were often employed to reach public
markets; on the other hand, the SEC was a “nobleman-regulator,” for the new
requirements stripped many private companies of the hope that they may
obtain growth-spurring capital in the public markets.
Once again, the SEC, through its registered securities exchanges, has taken
action against the source that triggered the 2005 Rule Amendments: reverse
mergers.4 Reverse mergers have again captured the attention of rule-makers

1. Aden R. Pavkov, Ghouls and Godsends? A Critique of “Reverse Merger” Policy, 3
BERKLEY BUS. L. J. 475, 477 (2006).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 501.
4. New York Stock Exchange Order Granting Accelerated Approval to the NYSE Proposed
Rule Change Adopting Additional Listing Requirements for Companies Applying to List After
Consummation of a “Reverse Merger” With a Shell Company, 76 Fed. Reg. 70,795 (Nov. 15,
2011) [hereinafter Approval to the NYSE Proposed Rule]; NASDAQ Stock Market Order
Granting Accelerated Approval to Proposed Rule Change Adopting Additional Listing
Requirements for Companies Applying to List After Consummation of a “Reverse Merger” With
219
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due to their association with many recent instances of fraudulent behavior.5 In
May and July of 2011, key stock exchanges in the United States proposed rules
that would impose even more stringent requirements on companies that
completed reverse mergers in order to quickly gain access to the investments
made on those exchanges.6 On November 8, 2011, the SEC approved these
requirements with a minor amendment.7 Arising from this recent action is the
same conflict that arose at the time of Pavkov’s article: when the market shows
signs of fault, is the solution to that fault best left to government regulation or
to the market itself?
A reverse merger transaction involves a merger between a private
company that is currently operating and a public shell company.8 The
Commission defines “shell company” as a company with “[n]o or nominal
operations” and either “[n]o or nominal assets,” “[a]ssets consisting solely of
cash and cash equivalents,” or “[a]ssets consisting of any amount of cash and
cash equivalents and nominal other assets.”9 The two companies merge, and
although the public company is the surviving entity, the private company
generally assumes control and owns most of the assets of the resulting postmerger company.10 Reverse mergers are advantageous because private
companies can become public through reverse mergers, thereby gaining access
to capital markets without the delay and expense associated with initial public
offerings (“IPOs”), the traditional manner of going public.11
Although there are significant advantages to going public through a reverse
merger, these transactions have recently caused concern due especially to
accounting fraud allegations.12 For example, Deer Consumer Products is a
Chinese corporation that used a reverse merger to gain access to U.S.
markets.13 It has since been accused of manipulating revenue, earnings, and
profit margins on its financial statements, causing its share price to plummet by

a Shell Company, 76 Fed. Reg. 70,799 (Nov. 15, 2011) [hereinafter Approval to NASDAQ
Proposed Rule].
5. Approval to the NYSE Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 70,795; Approval to NASDAQ
Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 70,800.
6. Approval to the NYSE Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 70,795; Approval to NASDAQ
Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 70,799.
7. Approval to the NYSE Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 70,795; Approval to NASDAQ
Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 70,800.
8. New York Stock Exchange Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Amending
Exchange’s Listed Company Manual, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,513, 49,513 (Aug. 10, 2011) [hereinafter
the NYSE Amending Exchange’s Listed Company Manual].
9. SEC Definitions of Terms, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2011).
10. The NYSE Amending Exchange’s Listed Company Manual, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,513.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Michael Vodicka, American Stocks Thriving in China, ZACKS.COM (June 2, 2011),
http://www.zacks.com/commentary/17885/American+Stocks+Thriving+in+China?.
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nearly fifty percent.14 Another reverse merger company is China MediaExpress
Holdings, Inc., whose main auditor resigned due to alleged inabilities to verify
the accuracy of the company’s statements15 and whose largest customer was
discovered to be nonexistent.16 In response, the SEC has taken action against
reverse merger companies by suspending trading in their securities, revoking
their securities registration, and initiating enforcement proceedings against
their auditing firms.17 In addition, both the New York Stock Exchange
(“NYSE”) and the NASDAQ Stock Market (“NASDAQ”) have filed proposed
rules that would impose more stringent requirements on reverse mergers in
order to protect investors from the increasingly common accounting fraud
associated with reverse merger companies.18 The Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) is also responding by engaging in oversight
negotiations with China,19 the foreign country which has provided the most
reverse merger transactions resulting in access to American markets.20
This comment will provide further analysis into both of the problems
associated with reverse mergers, focusing on Chinese transactions due to the
great number of and notable problems associated with such transactions, and
the responses to these transactions. The action of regulators, including the
SEC, NASDAQ, the NYSE, and the PCAOB, will be pitted against the action
of the market itself. It is quite clear that reverse mergers, particularly Chinese
reverse mergers, have had devastating effects on investors, and it is also clear
that many of these companies have quickly confronted the market’s response
as firm after firm watches its share price disintegrate.21 While commentators
provided arguments supporting both more regulation and less, the SEC
continued to delay the adoption of any additional rules.22 Meanwhile, the
market itself instigated the decline of share prices of many Chinese reverse

14. Id.
15. Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Is Every Chinese Firm a Scam?, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2011, at
A13.
16. Vodicka, supra note 13.
17. The NYSE Amending Exchange’s Listed Company Manual, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,513.
18. Id.; NASDAQ Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Adopt Additional Listing
Requirements for Reverse Mergers, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,781, 34,781 (June 8, 2011) [hereinafter
NASDAQ Proposed Rule].
19. Press Release, SEC, US and Chinese Regulators Meet in Beijing on Audit Oversight
Cooperation (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-164.htm.
20. See PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., ACTIVITY SUMMARY AND AUDIT
IMPLICATIONS FOR REVERSE MERGERS INVOLVING COMPANIES FROM THE CHINA REGION 3
(Mar. 14, 2011) [hereinafter OVERSIGHT BOARD].
21. See Dinny McMahon, Stung, Chinese Firms Now Look to Go Private, WALL ST. J., Sept.
2, 2011, at C1.
22. Approval to the NYSE Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 70,795; Approval to NASDAQ
Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 70,799.
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merger companies and even pushed some of these firms out of public trading.23
Although the never-ending question still remains whether the market really is
best left to mend itself, the current chain of events indicates that the SEC has,
unintentionally, left the market to do so.
Ultimately, it may be concluded that government regulation is essential in
this arena. Although government delay has caused the market to police itself,
with help only from the SEC’s revocation of the registration of some firms and
its initiation of enforcement proceedings, and although the final rules as
adopted by the Commission are insufficient since they are off-target,
government regulation is crucial because the inability of required
investigations of Chinese companies that list on the U.S. market renders
market scrutiny inadequate. Neither pure regulation nor pure market freedom is
sufficient. As demonstrated by the current chain of events, it is only through
the mix of government regulation and market scrutiny that investors are amply
protected before making their investments.
I. BACKGROUND TO CAPITAL MARKETS AND APPLICABLE LAW
In order to fully comprehend the effects of reverse mergers and the
responses to the problems associated with them, it is important to have an
understanding of the markets in which they act and the laws that govern those
markets.
A.

Capital Markets

There are two types of markets in which a corporation’s securities are
traded: a primary market and a secondary market.24 The primary market is
where the corporation sells its shares to investors and is where the traditional
IPO takes place.25 In contrast, the secondary market is where investors trade
stocks among themselves, and the company which issued the shares is no
longer a significant participant in the market.26 The secondary market is
actually created by the corporation going public, for when the initial
shareholders begin trading the company’s securities with other investors, the
company gains access to the secondary market.27 This secondary market is
where the current accounting problems associated with reverse mergers affect

23. McMahon, supra note 21 (“Shareholders saw billions of dollars in paper losses over the
past year after a wave of accounting irregularities surfaced at dozens of U.S.-listed Chinese firms,
prompting exchanges to delist several companies,” and noting that many Chinese reverse merger
companies that sought access to the U.S. market are now seeking to go private with the help of
private-equity groups that will buy out outside shareholders).
24. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS § 1.1(A) (2002).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. § 3.3(B).
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investors who buy and sell the post-merger company’s stocks.28 Moreover, it is
this secondary market that private companies aspire to reach when they
consider going public through a reverse merger.29 Secondary markets are
desirable because they allow the company’s securities to obtain liquidity,
meaning investors can freely sell the company’s securities without involving
the company itself.30 This, in turn, allows the company to raise capital in the
primary market more easily and at lower cost because investors, in general,
prefer liquid securities and are typically willing to pay more for them.31
When the effects of reverse mergers are discussed, commentators refer to
the effects on investors, which are determined by analyzing how the problems
that lie within a reverse merger transaction have affected the value of a
company’s stock.32 Here, the focus is on common stock, rather than preferred
stock (which are given superior rights over those of common stock and often
have priority in terms of dividends and liquidation).33 When analyzing the
value of stock, “market capitalization” is a term that is often used. This is a
general measure of the size of the company and is estimated by multiplying the
share price of a company’s stock by the number of shares that have been
purchased by investors, which, as opposed to those shares that have been
retained by the corporation, are called outstanding shares.34 The PCAOB has
used market capitalization to demonstrate that Chinese reverse mergers
generally retain less value compared to Chinese IPOs, suggesting reverse
mergers will provide less return for investors than IPOs.35

28. See McMahon, supra note 21 (“Shareholders saw billions of dollars in paper losses over
the past year after a wave of accounting irregularities surfaced at dozens of U.S.-listed Chinese
firms . . . . Many of these companies came to the U.S. because they were too small and lacked the
influence to win a listing on China’s state-run exchanges. Plus, there was ample demand from
U.S. investors. Most listed through so-called reverse mergers . . . .”).
29. Id.
30. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 24, § 3.3(B).
31. Id.; see also JOHN F. SEEGAL, SECURITIES LAW TECHNIQUES § 13.01, available at
LEXIS (suggesting, inter alia: that going public allows a company to raise capital, results in
fewer operating restriction than a private placement, and usually creates “a trading market in the
stock which provides continuing liquidity for the stockholders[.]”).
32. See McMahon, supra note 21.
33. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 24, § 3.2(B)(3).
34. Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 478 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (defining market
capitalization as the number of shares multiplied by the prevailing share price).
35. OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 20, at 1 (“As of March 31, 2010, the market
capitalization of the 159 CRM companies identified by ORA staff was $12.8 billion, less than
half the $27.2 billion market capitalization of the 56 Chinese companies that completed U.S.
initial public offerings (“IPOs”) during the period covered by this research note.”).
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Another way in which market capitalization affects reverse merger stocks
is through its connection to market efficiency.36 In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the
Supreme Court adopted the efficient market theory, noting that the market
price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly available
information.37 Thus, an efficient market is one that adequately digests
information in order to move the price of a company’s stock when new
information relating to the company’s financial character is publicized. Market
efficiency is therefore very beneficial to investors involved in markets in which
reverse merger companies have engaged in fraudulent practices because those
investors will be cautioned about foul corporate practices when stock prices
fall.38 Market capitalization has been considered one of the most important
factors in determining market efficiency because firms with larger market
capitalization are less likely to have pricing inefficiencies since they will be
more heavily targeted by market researchers.39 Thus, market capitalization can
be of great importance to an investor when determining whether to make a
particular investment.40

36. Krogman, 202 F.R.D. at 478 (Market capitalization “may be an indicator of market
efficiency because there is a greater incentive for stock purchasers to invest in more highly
capitalized corporations.”).
37. 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988) (“Recent empirical studies have tended to confirm Congress’
premise that the market price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly
available information, and, hence, any material misrepresentations.”); see also William O. Fisher,
Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us Do Justice in a Time of Madness?, 54 EMORY L.J.
843, 850 (2005) (As explained by Fisher, there are three forms of the efficient market theory: (1)
the weak form, which claims that “a stock’s price is at least substantially independent of past
price performance,” (2) the semi-strong form, which was adopted by the Supreme Court in Basic,
which suggests that “current prices fully reflect public knowledge,” and (3) the strong form,
which hypothesizes that “both public and private information are fully reflected in the price of a
stock.”).
38. Note, however, that market efficiency is not necessarily an indication of the true value of
the stock. Instead, it simply suggests that publicly available information is reflected in the stock’s
price. See Fisher, supra note 37, at 850 (“At least in its simplest form, the theory does not rest on
a notion that the market price is the ‘right’ price in the sense of correctly capturing the value of a
company, but simply that the price of the company’s stock moves when new information relating
to the company’s fortunes becomes public.”).
39. See O’Neil v. Appel, 165 F.R.D. 479, 503 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (noting (1) that one of the
most important factors in determining market efficiency is firm size, which is measured by
market capitalization, and (2) that investors have an incentive to invest in larger firms (with larger
market capitalization) because those firms have an “incentive to eliminate mispricing,” for
“market participants have greater incentives to invest resources in assessing the value of larger
capitalization firms.” On the other hand, pricing inefficiencies are more prominent with smaller
companies which have smaller market capitalization.).
40. See id.
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Applicable Law

The law governing the current reverse merger problems consists of both
state corporate law and federal securities law. While the merger transaction
itself is subject to state law, the trade of the post-merger company’s stock is
regulated by federal law.41 Furthermore, the securities exchanges themselves
have their own regulations regarding trades made within their markets.42 Each
of these aspects of reverse merger law is discussed below.
1.

Corporate Merger Law

Corporate mergers are a matter of state law. This analysis will focus on
Delaware corporate law, embodied in the Delaware General Corporation Law
(“DGCL”), for several reasons: (1) Delaware is the leading state for corporate
law,43 (2) more than half of the corporations listed for trading on the NYSE are
incorporated in Delaware,44 (3) there is evidence that shell brokers often
acquire shell companies that are incorporated in a “secrecy-friendly” state,
such as Delaware,45 and (4) the buyer in Chinese reverse mergers is often a
holding company based in Delaware, with its operations in China.46 Not only
does the DGCL allow for mergers between Delaware corporations and
corporations of other states, but the DGCL also allows any company
incorporated in Delaware to merge with corporations from other countries so
long as the foreign country’s laws permit such a merger.47 In transacting a
merger, the pre-merger corporations enter into an agreement of merger, which
must be filed with the state and includes information such as the terms and
conditions of the merger, the mode of carrying the merger into effect, and the
manner of converting shares.48 The DGCL also indicates that mergers between
domestic and foreign companies must be “adopted, approved, certified,
executed, and acknowledged” by each domestic corporation in the same
manner as when a domestic corporation merges with another domestic

41. See Michael Rapoport, Alarms Sounded on ‘Reverse Mergers’, WALL ST. J., June 10,
2011, at C2 (“But the commission doesn’t have the authority to ban reverse mergers, even if it
wanted to, SEC officials say, as corporate mergers are issues of state law.”).
42. SEC, The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, http://sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last
visited June 2, 2012).
43. LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., DELAWARE DEPT. OF STATE, DIV. OF CORPORATIONS, WHY
CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 1, 1 (2007).
44. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 24, § 1.3(A).
45. Nanette Byrnes & Lynnley Browning, Special Report: China’s Shortcut to Wall Street,
REUTERS (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/01/us-shell-china-idUSTRE
7702S520110801.
46. Id.
47. 8 Del. C. § 252(a) (2011).
48. Id. § 252(b)–(c).
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corporation.49 This means that, unless required by the corporation’s certificate
of incorporation, a vote of the stockholders of the public shell company is not
necessary to authorize the reverse merger, so long as the agreement of merger
does not amend the surviving company’s certificate of incorporation and each
share of stock of the public company that is outstanding immediately prior to
the effective date of the merger is to be an identical outstanding or treasury
share of the surviving corporation after the merger.50
Stephen Bainbridge’s Corporation Law and Economics provides a brief
overview of the mechanics of corporate mergers, which can be applied to
reverse merger transactions. First, the public shell company becomes the
surviving entity, as designated in the merger agreement, and the separate
existence of the private corporation ceases.51 Second, all property, contracts,
liabilities, and pending legal proceedings associated with the pre-merger
corporations become assigned to the surviving public corporation.52 Third, the
articles of incorporation and bylaws of the public company are amended and
become effective.53 Lastly, the shares of the pre-merger corporations are
converted, and former shareholders are entitled only those rights provided in
the merger agreement or by statute.54
2.

The Law Behind Public Trades

Three federal laws regulate public companies and their securities. The first
is the Securities Act of 1933, which is predominantly concerned with the
primary market and is premised on the dual motive of mandating disclosure of
material information and preventing fraud.55 It requires any offer or sale of
securities using the means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce to be
registered with the SEC.56 By requiring registration with the federal
Commission, the 1933 Act ensures that buyers of securities receive complete
and accurate information about the public companies and their stocks before
they make investments. Registration forms that must be filed by all companies
which sell their securities in the United States require: “a description of the
company’s properties and business; a description of the security to be offered
for sale; information about the management of the company; and financial

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. § 252(c).
Id. § 251(f).
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 24, § 12.3(A).
Id.
Id.
Id.
WILLIAM A. KLEIN, J. MARK RAMSEYER, & STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, BUSINESS
ASSOCIATIONS: AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS 404 (7th ed. 2009).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2006).
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statements certified by independent accountants.”57 These registration
statements become public after a company files them with the SEC.58
The second federal law that regulates publicly traded companies is the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which also requires securities listed and
traded on national securities exchanges, such as NASDAQ and the NYSE, to
be registered.59 It is therefore concerned primarily with secondary market
transactions.60 Registration under the 1934 Act requires certain filings and
annual reports to be made available to shareholders, including audited financial
statements, management analysis of the firm’s financial condition, and
financial data.61 Through the 1934 Act, Congress created the SEC, which was
given authority to register, regulate, and oversee brokerage firms, transfer
agents, clearing agencies, and the exchanges themselves.62 Furthermore, the
Act empowered the SEC to require periodic reporting of information by
publicly traded companies and to discipline all entities regulated by the SEC
that engage in prohibited conduct.63 Although private companies bypass the
public offer registration through reverse mergers, they are still subject to the
1934 Act due to the fact that the surviving company is publicly traded. The
public shell company involved in a reverse merger transaction also must file a
Form 8-K, which requires companies to report significant events about which
investors should be informed.64 Lastly, section 5.06 mandates the disclosure of
a change in shell company status, which occurs through a reverse merger
transaction since the resulting public company is no longer a shell and instead
maintains the operations and assets of the formerly private company.65
The third federal law, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, was enacted in 2002 and
implemented significant reforms to securities law.66 In response to the Enron
bankruptcy and public reaction to similar corporate accounting and
mismanagement issues, Congress enacted the Act to enhance corporate
disclosure and to improve the effectiveness of information given to investors
by imposing more stringent reporting requirements.67 The Act also established
the PCAOB, which oversees public accounting firms and institutes auditing,
quality control, and ethics standards to be used by public accounting firms

57. The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 42.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 55, at 404.
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(b).
62. The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 42.
63. Id.
64. OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 20, at 2.
65. Id.; see also SEC, Form 8-K, http://www.sec.gov/answers/form8k.htm.
66. The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 42.
67. Id.; see also Larry E. Ribstein, Market v. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A
Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. Corp. L. 1, 1–2 (2002).
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when performing audits for publicly traded corporations.68 Thus, the
accounting firms that audit the reverse merger companies that list on U.S.
exchanges are subject to oversight by the PCAOB.
3.

Rules of the Exchanges

Each stock exchange also has its own initial listing and maintenance
criteria that apply to all companies that trade on the exchange. In fact, the 1934
Securities Exchange Act requires the exchanges to register with the SEC,
establish rules permitting the discipline of misbehaving market participants,
and ensure market integrity and investor protection.69 The rules proposed by
the exchanges are published for comment and require SEC approval.70 Each
exchange may also decide to remove, or delist, securities based on the number
of shareholders, trading volume, the number of publicly held shares, aggregate
market value of shares outstanding, and the total global market capitalization.71
Since the NYSE has been involved in proposing new listing requirements for
reverse mergers, it is interesting to note that the NYSE has been recognized as
both the most respected exchange and the most stringent exchange in terms of
listing requirements.72
C. The Effect of Securities Law on the Decision to Go Public Through a
Reverse Merger
As previously mentioned, a company would desire to gain access to
secondary markets in order to earn capital and encourage investment in their
company.73 However, with securities law in mind, there are many reasons why
this same company would want to avoid going public through a traditional IPO
and to seek a reverse merger transaction instead. First, IPOs are required to be
registered by securities law, and registered public offerings are very
expensive.74 Second, there exist certain liability provisions that are associated
only with registered public offerings, which would lead to more costs in the
future should the provisions come into play.75 Third, a company may be too
small for an initial public offering to be viable.76 On the other hand, while the

68. 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2006).
69. The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 42.
70. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b).
71. See Pavkov, supra note 1, at 508 (describing the NYSE’s considerations for removal of a
security).
72. Id.
73. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 24, § 3.3(B).
74. Id. §3.5(D).
75. Id.
76. SEEGAL, supra note 31 (suggesting that the smallest size IPO a major underwriter will
consider is $15,000,000 and that the least number of shares that should be offered to ensure
adequate “public float” is 1,500,000).
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public shell company must report a reverse merger transaction with the SEC,
there is no regulatory oversight of the transaction, although it results in public
market access, and there are often few impediments in the way of listing on an
exchange.77 Thus, there is an incentive for those who wish to gain access to
capital markets to avoid registration and, instead, go public through a reverse
merger. It is important to note, however, that while reverse mergers save
private companies from the burdens of registering before going public—like
companies using an IPO—the surviving reverse merger companies are still
required, post-merger, to adhere to the disclosure rules that apply to all
publicly traded companies since the surviving entity to a reverse merger is, in
fact, the publicly traded company.78
II. EFFECTS OF REVERSE MERGERS ON U.S. MARKETS
With the background of capital markets and their laws in mind, the effect
of reverse mergers on the securities markets may effectively be analyzed.
While all reverse mergers have the potential to raise the concerns discussed
above, it is appropriate to focus on those which involve Chinese private
companies due to the great number of such transactions and the particular
attention they have received recently as their securities have continuously
invoked investor and regulator concern.79
A.

Chinese Reverse Mergers

Twenty-six percent of all reverse mergers that obtained access to American
exchanges between 2007 and 2010 involved Chinese private companies that
merged with public companies traded on the U.S. market.80 Not only do
Chinese companies comprise a very large number of reverse mergers that gain
access to American investment, but Chinese companies also use the reverse
merger process more than the traditional IPO process for obtaining listing on
the NYSE, NASDAQ, and other U.S. exchanges.81 The reverse merger
transaction has become prevalent among Chinese corporations because small

77. Byrnes & Browning, supra note 45; Rapoport, supra note 41; see also the NYSE
Amending Exchange’s Listed Company Manual, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,513 (“While the public shell
company is required to report the reverse merger in a Form 8-K filing with the Securities and
Exchange Commission . . . generally there are no registration requirements under the Securities
Act of 1933 . . . at that point in time, as there would be for an IPO.”).
78. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–oo (2006) (SEC is
empowered with requiring publicly traded companies to file reports).
79. See OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 20, at 3 (showing that between January 2007 and
March 2010, there were 159 Chinese reverse mergers, composing 26% of total reverse mergers,
and, in fact, Chinese companies use the reverse merger process more than the initial public
offering process).
80. Id.
81. Id.
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Chinese corporations are often unable to go public in the United States through
an IPO since investment banking firms frequently refuse to underwrite for
them.82 Yet American investors welcome the growth potential of these
companies, allowing them to obtain access to their investments through reverse
mergers.83
It appears that the appeal of U.S. markets to Chinese firms is a
combination of both the difficulty of those companies to go public in their own
country and their desire to reach American investors. The Chinese stock
exchanges are state-run and mandate strict requirements for those desiring to
go public, making it quite challenging for companies to do so.84 Many of the
companies that do not have the influence or the capacity to gain public listing
on Chinese exchanges wind up seeking access to U.S. markets.85 Additionally,
the U.S. markets allow these smaller, less influential companies to access
American investors who are receptive to Chinese stocks due to their desire to
profit from the growing Chinese market.86
As Chinese reverse mergers have increasingly gained access to U.S.
markets, the discovery of their association with numerous instances of
fraudulent behavior has caused great concern.87 Such fraudulent behavior has
rapidly depreciated the value of the stocks of many Chinese reverse merger
companies.88 The Bloomberg Chinese Reverse Merger Index indicates that as
of October 22, 2011, Chinese reverse merger share prices had taken a year-todate decline of 59%.89 As of October 22, 2011, NASDAQ, S&P 500, and the
Dow Jones Industrial Average had all enjoyed a one-year increase in share
prices by 7.45%, 6.82%, and 8.9%, respectively.90 In contrast, Chinese reverse

82. Rapoport, supra note 41.
83. Id. (“Reverse mergers have grown popular in China in part because it is hard for Chinese
companies to go public in their own country. Meanwhile, U.S. investors are eager for ways they
can tap investment opportunities in the huge, growing Chinese market.”).
84. McMahon, supra note 21; Rapoport, supra note 41.
85. McMahon, supra note 21.
86. Rapaport, supra note 41.
87. David K. Cheng, Cindy Zhu, & David Lee, Reverse Mergers by China-based
Companies: Is This the End? 43 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1433, 1433–34 (July 11, 2011).
88. McMahon, supra note 21 (“Shareholders saw billions of dollars in paper losses over the
past year after a wave of accounting irregularities surfaced at dozens of U.S.-listed Chinese firms,
prompting exchanges to delist several companies. . . . The Bloomberg Chinese Reverse Mergers
Index has fallen about 60% since mid-November, when sentiment started turning against the
sector amid widening allegations of misconduct”).
89. Bloomberg Chinese Reverse Merger Index (as visited on Oct. 22, 2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/CHINARTO:IND. “Year-to-date” refers to the time period
beginning January 1 (the start of the calendar year) up to the present date.
90. NASDAQ Composite Index (as visited on Oct. 22, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/
quote/CCMP:IND; S&P 500 Index (as visited on Oct. 22, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/
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merger share prices decreased by 58.41% in one year.91 The rapid decline of
Chinese reverse merger share prices has been exacerbated by short sellers,
who, realizing the likelihood of faulty share price foundations, target these
companies.92 Short sellers research listed companies to discover signs of fraud
and then enter into short sale contracts involving the stocks of fraudulentbehaving companies, betting that their share prices will fall.93 After the short
sale contract is complete, the short seller publishes his research, causing a
decline in the price of the companies’ securities.94
Publicly traded Chinese companies Deer Consumer Products and China
MediaExpress Holdings, Inc. provide examples of how drastic the market
effects of fraudulent behavior of Chinese reverse mergers can be. At the end of
2010, Deer Consumer Products carried a share price of over $11.95 When
suspicion aroused regarding the company manipulating revenue, earnings, and
margins, its share prices plummeted, ending at $5.73 in July of 2011.96 Since
the day that China MediaExpress Holdings, Inc.’s biggest customer was first
found to be non-existent, its shares have fallen from $12.25 to a mere 10
cents.97 In March of 2011, China MediaExpress’s outside auditing firm
resigned, claiming that “it could no longer ‘rely on the representations of
management.’”98 Although these are only two examples of Chinese reverse
merger companies that have engaged in fraudulent behavior, it is clear from
Bloomberg’s index of Chinese reverse merger stock behavior in the aggregate
that skepticism about fraud has come to plague Chinese reverse mergers as a
class.99 Since the efficient market theory has established that stock price is
reflective of the market’s digestion of publicly available information, as
opposed to the stock’s true value,100 this phenomenon may simply be a product
of the vast publication of problems associated with some reverse merger
companies. The publication of foul information about certain Chinese reverse

quote/SPX:IND; Dow Jones Industrial Average Index (as visited on Oct. 22, 2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/INDU:IND.
91. Bloomberg Chinese Reverse Merger Index (as visited on Oct. 22, 2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/CHINARTO:IND. Note that this is different from the “year-todate” percentage and instead refers to the time period beginning one year from the present date to
the present date.
92. Cheng, Zhu & Lee, supra note 87, at 1433–34.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Vodicka, supra note 13; Stock Quote of Deer Consumer Products, Inc., ZACKS.COM (as
visited on Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.zacks.com/stock/quote/DEER.
96. Vodicka, supra note 13.
97. Id.
98. Jenkins, supra note 15.
99. See generally Bloomberg Chinese Reverse Merger Index, http://www.bloomberg.com/
quote/CHINARTO:IND (last visited Oct. 22, 2011).
100. See supra Part I.A.
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merger companies may spoil the stock prices of law-abiding Chinese reverse
merger companies simply because investors become skeptical about all
transactions of this type coming from China.101
B.

Concerns About Auditing

The discovery of fraudulent behavior associated with many reverse
mergers, particularly with Chinese reverse mergers, has triggered the muchpublicized concern about the auditing of reverse merger companies.102 The
financial statements of companies listed on U.S. exchanges are subject to
audits performed by outside auditing firms registered with the PCAOB.103
Accurate auditing is essential to protecting investors who rely upon the
financial statements filed by companies listed on the exchanges, and auditing
requirements were actually employed by regulators in order to protect
investors.104 Auditors travel to the company to be audited and perform
assessments of that company’s financial position, ensuring the financial
statements and disclosures made by the company accurately represent its true
financial character.105 Also, auditors confirm that the company has abided by
applicable accounting and disclosure standards.106
As a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the auditors of publicly traded
companies are subject to the oversight of the PCAOB.107 In fact, all companies,
whether domestic or foreign, whose stock trades on the U.S. market must use
an auditor that is registered with the PCAOB. Such auditor is thus required to
meet the standards for auditing, quality control, and ethics set by the Board.108
These outside auditing firms can be either American or foreign.109 About 900

101. See McMahon, supra note 21 (China Fire & Security Inc.’s share price declined sixty
percent in one year even though the company was not involved in the investigations or allegations
associated with many Chinese reverse mergers).
102. As indicated by the multiple articles about reverse mergers in The Wall Street Journal. A
search on LexisNexis of the terms “reverse merger” within the same sentence as
“audit/auditing/auditor” produced ten articles in the year of 2011.
103. 15 USC § 7211(c) (2006).
104. James R. Doty, Chairman, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., Looking Ahead: Auditor
Oversight, Council of Institutional Investors 2011 Spring Meeting (Apr. 4, 2011), http://pcaob
us.org/News/Speech/Pages/04042011_DotyLookingAhead.aspx.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(c); 15 U.S.C. § 7212(a) (“[I]t shall be unlawful for any person that is
not a registered public accounting firm to prepare or issue, or to participate in the preparation or
issuance of, any audit report with respect to any issuer.”).
109. See James R. Doty, Chairman, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., Update on PCAOB
Developments, PCAOB SAG Meeting (Mar. 24, 2011), http://pcaobus.org/News/Speech/Pages/
03242011_DotyStatement.aspx.
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foreign auditing firms are registered with the PCAOB,110 including fifty-three
auditing firms that are located in China and fifty-three that are located in Hong
Kong.111
As previously explained, the management and most of the assets of the
entity surviving the reverse merger transaction are retained by the previously
private company.112 In a Chinese reverse merger transaction, this private
company is Chinese. Thus, Chinese reverse mergers typically result in a
corporation with its operations conducted in China, while its securities are
traded in the United States.113 Since their securities are traded on U.S.
exchanges, the financial statements of these Chinese companies must be
audited by PCAOB-registered auditors.114 A study of Chinese reverse mergers
between 2007 and 2010 indicates that U.S. auditing firms audited 74% of the
Chinese companies, while 24% of those companies were audited by registered
Chinese auditing firms.115
In some cases involving the auditing of Chinese reverse merger companies,
PCAOB inspectors have flagged auditing deficiencies and have initiated
enforcement proceedings against auditors for violating PCAOB auditing
standards.116 However, the PCAOB has also indicated that it is likely that
accounting firms registered with the PCAOB are not “conducting audits of
companies with operations outside the U.S. in accordance with PCAOB
standards.”117 The PCAOB has noted that although U.S. auditing firms are
slated to audit the majority of Chinese reverse merger companies, the U.S.
auditing firms often allow all or some of the auditing to be performed by local
Chinese auditing firms, in some instances due to language barriers.118 This
outsourcing reduces the likelihood that the U.S. auditing firm retains a true
understanding of the company’s financial condition, let alone a well-grounded
ability to assert that the company’s reports and financial statements are
accurate.119 The PCAOB has developed specific standards for auditors that
employ other independent auditors to perform parts of its work, as the U.S.

110. Id.
111. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., Registered Public Accounting Firms with the
PCAOB As of Wednesday, December 21, 2011, http://pcaobus.org/Registration/Firms/Docu
ments/Registered_Firms_by_Location.pdf.
112. The NYSE Amending Exchange’s Listed Company Manual, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,513.
113. OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 20, at 2.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 6.
116. Doty, supra note 109.
117. OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 20, at 2.
118. Id.
119. See generally id. at 2 (explaining the concern that U.S. registered accounting firms are
conducting audits not in accordance with PCAOB standards for companies outside the United
States).
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auditing firms often do with local Chinese auditors.120 However, the PCAOB
alleges that many U.S. firms are failing to abide by those standards,
particularly by allowing the local Chinese auditor to complete virtually all of
the work.121 One U.S. auditing firm hired a Chinese accounting firm to help
audit a Chinese corporation and then allowed the Chinese auditors to both
perform and maintain substantially all of the auditing.122 Meanwhile, the U.S.
firm failed to even send personnel to the China region to oversee or aid in
performing the work.123 Moreover, the PCAOB has also expressed concern
that even the innocent inability of U.S. auditing firms to understand the local
business environment in China may negatively impact the audits of those
companies.124
Even more problematic, concern has arisen that the PCAOB is unable to
investigate the auditing of all Chinese reverse merger companies, which is
particularly troublesome due to the fraudulent behavior that has recently been
revealed.125 Although the PCAOB can inspect audits performed by U.S.
auditing firms on foreign entities, the PCAOB has consistently confronted
resistance in attempting to do so with the local Chinese auditing firms that are
often employed.126 Even Chinese auditing firms registered with the PCAOB
have been off-limits to inspectors.127 Moreover, apparently Chinese regulators
have also confronted difficulty in overseeing Chinese corporations, for, as
explained by a private investigator in Hong Kong, “[i]n emerging markets such
as China, it’s hard to get documentary evidence.”128 The inability for both U.S.
and Chinese regulators to oversee the auditing of Chinese corporations
exacerbates the reverse merger problem, as there are limited checks on the
financial statements of these companies. Also, as the United States and China
continue to negotiate as to how best to develop a coordinated solution to the
reverse merger issue, the inability of either country to monitor Chinese
companies and their auditors will provide further resistance against any such
solution.
An example of a Chinese reverse merger company that has experienced the
effects of accounting fraud allegations is Sino-Forest Corporation, which is

120. Id. at 7.
121. Id. at 7–8.
122. OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 20, at 8.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Chairman:
Remarks Before the Women in Finance Symposium (July 12, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/2011/spch071211mls.htm.
126. Doty, supra note 109.
127. Id.
128. Alison Tudor, China Firms Face Research Armies, WALL ST. J., June 28, 2011, at C1.
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listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange.129 After allegations of accounting errors
surfaced, Sino-Forest’s shares declined eighty percent in one month alone.130
What is interesting about Sino-Forest is that, even after these fraud allegations
have surfaced and the corporation’s stock price deteriorated, Sino-Forest has
been suggested as being the best Chinese company for investment.131 This is
indicative of just how troublesome the unknown may be, for the alternative to
investing in Sino-Forest is investing in Chinese companies whose auditing
practices may be completely off-limits to the PCAOB’s oversight. As warned
by one involved in the field of securities, this alternative may be more
threatening than investing in a corporation whose accounting fraud allegations
have already been publicized.132 Sino-Forest is audited by Ernst & Young, a
very large and respected auditing firm, and had created a market capitalization
of six billion dollars before accounting fraud was alleged.133 Examples of
practices that contributed to Sino-Forest’s stock decline include its use of fiftyeight holding companies that were unwilling to release financial records and its
requirement that auditors could examine only 28 of the 267 bank accounts
Sino-Forest holds in China.134 Furthermore, Sino-Forest provides an example
of how business is conducted in China—through informal and shady
agreements with state or party officials.135 As the Sino-Forest example
demonstrates, business in China is based upon personal relationships with
officials, and it is the loss of these relationships that Chinese companies fear
from the departure of their officers.136 Thus, financial tampering by the wellconnected may be tolerated by a company’s board of directors in order to
maintain strong relationships with powerful officials.
C. Non-Reverse Merger Chinese Companies
Although reverse mergers have caused Chinese firms to attract the
attention of regulators and market participants alike, the issues associated with
129. Craig Wong, Sino-Forest’s Fall Heard, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, December 27, 2011, at
B9.
130. Peter Stein, Chinese Firms Need to Open Up Books, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2011, at C3
(noting that Sino-Forest’s shares declined in price by 80% between May and June of 2011).
131. Paul Roderick Gregory, Chinese Stock Alarm? Sino-Forest May Be the Best of the
Bunch, FORBES (Nov. 27, 2011, 1:07 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/paulroderickgregory/
2011/11/27/chinese-stock-alarm-sino-forest-may-be-the-best-of-the-bunch/.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. (“The Sino-Forest case reveals that business is done in China through informal
agreements with state or party officials, who grant access to licenses, resources, and markets only
if they are paid under the table. There can be no official records of these payments. Auditors are
not allowed to see bank accounts, and transactions are muddied by a proliferation of shadowy
intermediaries, which are likely owned by state and party officials or their families.”).
136. Gregory, supra note 131.
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the accounting practices of Chinese firms are not limited to reverse merger
transactions.137 It is apparent that Chinese firms present similar problems when
they have gone public through the traditional IPO.138
For example, Renren, Inc. is a Chinese social-networking company that
reached U.S. markets through an IPO and is now trading at about half of its
IPO price.139 Renren critically changed information available to investors just
before going public by indicating that it expected to face a smaller growth rate
than initially anticipated, and later, the head of its audit committee resigned.140
Although the auditor resigned without providing an explanation, investors can
assume that the resignation was triggered by fraudulent activity, which has
been the reason for other auditor resignations.141 Both of these events led to
investor skepticism and a declining share price.142 Longtop Financial
Technologies, another Chinese firm that went public in the United States
through an IPO and now lists on the NYSE, experienced a fifty percent share
price decline after it was confronted with accusations that the company made
false statements and manipulated its balance sheets in order to publish better
profit margins.143 The SEC brought administrative proceedings against
Longtop on November 10, 2011, alleging Longtop violated the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 by failing to file appropriate reports and failing to
provide accurate information within its reports.144
Accordingly, it appears that regardless of whether Chinese companies have
obtained market access through IPOs or reverse mergers, the fact that they are
China-based companies is cause for concern. In fact, The Wall Street Journal
has noted that all Chinese companies, IPOs and reverse mergers alike, lack
arrangements with the PCAOB to allow proper inspection of audits performed
in China.145 Moreover, the use of local Chinese auditing firms to do much of
the work that the PCAOB anticipates U.S. firms will do is just as apparent with
companies that go public through IPOs.146 Over two dozen Chinese firms listed

137. See Stein, supra note 130 (noting the problems associated with both reverse merger and
IPO companies based in China); Vodicka, supra note 13 (suggesting that it is not sufficient to
simply bypass reverse mergers and invest in a regular IPO company).
138. See Stein, supra note 130; Vodicka, supra note 13.
139. Stein, supra note 130.
140. Id.
141. See id.; see also Jenkins, supra note 15 (stating that China MediaExpress’s auditing firm
resigned due to an inability to rely on management’s representations).
142. Stein, supra note 130.
143. Vodicka, supra note 13 (noting that Longtop shares declined from $35 per share to $18);
Tudor, supra note 128 (noting that Longtop is listed on the NYSE).
144. Longtop Fin. Techs. Ltd., Exchange Act Release No. 65734, 2011 WL 5444409 (Nov.
10, 2011).
145. Stein, supra note 130.
146. See id.
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in the United States declared resignations of their auditors or other major
accounting announcements in March and April of 2011 alone.147
D. How Investors Are Affected
Although studies show that Chinese companies have only accounted for
26% of reverse mergers and 13% of IPOs that ended in U.S. market access in
the past four years,148 the accounting irregularities associated with Chinese
firms are of particular cause for concern since American investors have been
so eager to invest in Chinese firms, perhaps allowing their zeal to blind them in
their hopes of making a profit off of such promising investments.149 China has
experienced tremendous growth in the past few years, which has prompted
foreign investors, including Americans, to invest in Chinese stocks and to
anticipate great profit from China’s persistent growth.150 The research director
of Muddy Waters Research, a company that investigates the true worth of
Chinese firms trading their securities in the United States, has noted that
Chinese companies actually target foreign investors with their accounting
frauds.151 For example, some firms have been discovered reporting larger
profits to the SEC than those they report to the Chinese State Administration
for Industry and Commerce.152 As a result of such targeting, the publication of
accounting problems linked to many U.S.-listed Chinese firms has confronted
shareholders with billions of dollars in losses over the past year.153 It is
interesting to note, however, that while fraudulent activity has been associated
with both Chinese reverse mergers and Chinese IPOs, the PCAOB reports
suggest that Chinese reverse merger companies are still less valuable than
Chinese companies that go public through the traditional IPO process.154 As of
March 31, 2010, total market capitalization for Chinese companies that

147. Jenkins, supra note 15.
148. OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 20, at 3–4, tbls.1 & 2.
149. See Owen Fletcher & Dinny McMahon, Investors Spooked by China: Small-Stock
Accounting Scandals Are Breeding Deeper Fears, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2011, at B1 (“For years
investors, swept up in the broader China growth story, gave Chinese companies that listed their
stocks on U.S. exchanges the benefit of the doubt on governance and regulatory issues.”); see
also Rapoport, supra note 41 (“U.S. investors are eager for ways they can tap investment
opportunities in the huge, growing Chinese market.”).
150. See Vodicka, supra note 13 (“Anyone who’s been paying attention to the Chinese
economy for the last few years knows the country is growing by leaps and bounds. Even after
economists recently downgraded growth projections for the far-east juggernaut, Q2 GDP is still
expected to clock in at an impressive 9%.”); see also Tudor, supra note 128 (“Investors around
the world eager to profit from China’s fast-growing economy want to know the risks.”).
151. Jenkins, supra note 15 (“For the most part, they keep their noses clean in China. If these
guys were pulling the same thing in China, the punishment is a bullet to the head.”).
152. Jenkins, supra note 15.
153. McMahon, supra note 20.
154. OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 20, at 4.
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completed IPOs was more than double that of Chinese companies that had
gone public through reverse mergers.155 As explained previously, this suggests
that investors should have greater incentive to invest in Chinese IPOs than in
Chinese reverse mergers since firms with larger market capitalization are less
likely to have pricing inefficiencies due to the likelihood that market
participants will spend more resources analyzing the value of those firms.156
When reverse merger companies report fraudulent and misleading
financial information, investors inappropriately value their securities. The
Supreme Court has explained the importance of accurate financial information
in the securities market, for the price of a company’s stock is determined by
the available material information regarding the company and its business.157
Thus, misleading information causes investors to place inappropriate value on
the securities associated with that information.158 Fraudulent reports suggest
that the assets of the companies are greater than they actually are, causing
investors to invest when they otherwise may not have.159 On the other hand,
investors have also been affected by the work of others interested in Chinese
firms such as private-equity groups and short sellers. Private-equity groups
have recently been working with several Chinese companies to buy out outside
shareholders, helping the firms go private.160 Most of these firms first went
public through reverse mergers, but as allegations of fraud surfaced and
investigations increased, these same firms are now seeking privatization.161
The work of private-equity groups has allowed many of these companies to
increase their share price.162 For example, China Fire & Security was listed on
NASDAQ and selling at $6.26 per share before a private-equity fund began
looking to buy out its shares.163 Six months later, however, China Fire &

155. Id.
156. O’Neil v. Appel, 165 F.R.D. at 479, 503 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (suggesting that investors
have an incentive to invest in larger firms (with larger market capitalization) because those firms
have an “incentive to eliminate mispricing,” for “market participants have greater incentives to
invest resources in assessing the value of larger capitalization firms,” yet, on the other hand,
pricing inefficiencies are more prominent with smaller companies, which thus have smaller
market capitalization); see supra Part I.A.
157. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244 (1988) (quoting In re LTV Securities
Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (“[T]he market is interposed between seller and
buyer and, ideally, transmits information to the investor in the processed form of a market price. .
. . The market is acting as the unpaid agent of the investor, informing him that given all the
information available to it, the value of the stock is worth the market price.”)).
158. See id. at 247.
159. Id. (“An investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by the market does so in
reliance on the integrity of that price.”).
160. McMahon, supra note 20.
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. Id.
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Security’s shares increased to $8.47 after the private-equity firm offered $9 per
share to outstanding shareholders.164 Private-equity firms thus add value to
stock by providing assurance that the stock will be sold, thereby raising the
stock price up to that of the private-equity firm’s buyout price. Investors
should be cautious, however, because there is some suspicion that such
privatization plans are used merely as a subterfuge to raise share prices while
the company has no true desire to go private.165 Investors have also been
affected by the work of short sellers, who reveal to investors the true value of
the firms they investigate when they publish their research.166 Their published
research then triggers the deterioration of the firm’s share price, as desired by
the short sellers, and investors become well aware of the true value of those
shares and of the condition of the associated firm.167
III. THE REACTION OF THE UNITED STATES
As previously discussed, the exchanges are required by the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act to establish rules permitting the discipline of market participants
and mechanisms that ensure market integrity and investor protection.168 These
rules are published for comment through the SEC and require SEC approval.169
Both the NYSE and NASDAQ published proposed rules that the exchanges
hoped would counter the numerous accounting irregularities associated with
reverse mergers and improve investor protection.170 Neither exchange,
however, has developed any sort of proposed rule or commentary that
addresses the same issues that arise with Chinese IPOs. The PCAOB has also
made efforts to work with Chinese authorities to establish mandates that will
ensure investigations of Chinese companies.171
A.

Proposed Rule Provided by the NYSE

The NYSE filed its proposed rule with the SEC on July 22, 2011.172 The
proposed rule amended the exchange’s “Listed Company Manual,” which
specifies the requirements that must be met to list and maintain listing on the

164. Id.
165. McMahon, supra note 20 (“Harbin Electric’s stock is trading at a discount of about 25%
to Abax’s proposed buyout price, indicating investor concerns that the deal might not happen. As
of Aug. 15, more than seven million shares had been borrowed for short selling, representing
almost a quarter of shares available for trading.”).
166. See Cheng, Zhu & Lee, supra note 87, at 1434.
167. Id.
168. The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 42; see supra Part I.B.3.
169. The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 42; see supra Part I.B.3.
170. The NYSE Amending Exchange’s Listed Company Manual, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,513;
NASDAQ Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 34,781.
171. Schapiro, supra note 125.
172. The NYSE Amending Exchange’s Listed Company Manual, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,513.
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exchange.173 The NYSE’s rule would require a reverse merger, in order to be
eligible for listing, to (1) trade for at least one year in the U.S. over-the-counter
market, on another national securities exchange, or on a foreign exchange, and
file the appropriate forms with the SEC, and (2) file all required reports with
the SEC beginning on the date of the consummation of the reverse merger.174
Furthermore, the reverse merger would be required to maintain a minimum
stock price of at least four dollars to remain listed.175
Through the publication of its proposed rule, the NYSE has announced its
belief that the amendments are vital to increasing transparency to issuers and
market participants alike by reducing the likelihood that reverse merger
fraudulent behavior will be revealed after listing.176 The NYSE noted that due
to the accounting fraud allegations that have surfaced regarding reverse
mergers, the NYSE has performed “heightened, risk-informed reviews” of
reverse merger firms aspiring to list on the exchange.177 Furthermore, the
NYSE points out that it has broad discretion in determining whether a certain
company may list on the exchange and that this discretion may be used to
develop more rigid requirements for listing.178 With respect to reverse mergers
and the recent allegations, the NYSE believes the use of its discretion in
establishing such requirements is warranted.179 The NYSE has also made sure
to note that this discretion also allows it to require additional disclosure or even
deny listing for firms that appear to be worthy of caution.180 The stipulation
that the reverse merger must trade for at least one year in a capital market will,
according to the NYSE, ensure the reliability of the firm’s operations and
financial reporting and will allow time for outside auditors to complete
investigations of the company and detect any accounting irregularities.181 The
NYSE also states that this one-year period will allow for “regulatory and
market scrutiny” of the firm, meaning that the work of short sellers and
research groups will be less likely to deteriorate the stock prices of a company
listed on the NYSE, since any irregularities would have been discovered in the
one-year period prior to listing on the NYSE.182

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 49,513–14.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 49.514.
The NYSE Amending Exchange’s Listed Company Manual, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,513.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 49,514.
Id.
See the YSE Amending Exchange’s Listed Company Manual, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,514.
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Proposed Rule Provided by NASDAQ

NASDAQ has also published a proposed rule to adopt additional listing
requirements for reverse mergers, which it filed with the SEC on May 26,
2011.183 Under its proposed rule, a reverse merger company will not be eligible
for listing unless the merged company had (1) traded for at least six months,
(2) maintained a bid price of four dollars per share or higher on at least thirty
of the most recent sixty trading days, and (3) filed appropriate reports.184
In the publication of its proposed rule, NASDAQ indicated a similar
rationale to that of the NYSE for its rule and for its concern regarding reverse
mergers.185 NASDAQ noted that the reason for its proposed rule change was
the recent attention to reverse mergers, the allegations of fraudulent activity,
the warnings of the PCAOB, an enforcement proceeding initiated by the SEC
regarding a reverse merger, and NASDAQ’s own experience with reverse
merger companies manipulating their prices to satisfy initial listing bid price
requirements.186 According to NASDAQ, its six-month “seasoning”
requirement would provide more time for regulators to observe trading patterns
and discover potentially manipulative trading, create a more legitimate
shareholder base, and improve reliability.187
C. Efforts by the PCAOB
The PCAOB has recently worked with the SEC to ally with Chinese
authorities in order to establish a mechanism through which the PCAOB and
Chinese authorities would coordinate in joint oversight of the auditing of
Chinese firms.188 The PCAOB has been particularly hopeful about creating
coordinated inspections of auditing firms that are registered with the PCAOB
but based in China.189 In July of 2011, the SEC and PCAOB met with officials
from China.190 This meeting was cause for optimism, for the American and
Chinese officials agreed that cross-border audit oversight will improve the
quality of public company auditing and will protect investors residing in both

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
note 19.
189.
190.
note 19.

NASDAQ Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 34,781.
Id. at 34,781–82.
Id. at 34,782.
Id.
Id. at 34,782–83.
U.S. and Chinese Regulators Meet in Beijing on Audit Oversight Cooperation, supra
Schapiro, supra note 125.
U.S. and Chinese Regulators Meet in Beijing on Audit Oversight Cooperation, supra
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the United States and China.191 As of December 2011, however, the PCAOB
still had not reached agreement with China about joint inspections.192
D. The Views of Commentators
Although there were relatively few commentators on the proposed
regulations of the exchanges, all of those who did provide comments felt that
the regulations should not be adopted as drafted. While only one commentator
believed that the regulations should be more stringent,193 the others believed
that the regulations proposed by NASDAQ and the NYSE were too
extensive.194 Evident from the comments were concerns that have been alluded
to above: Are the regulations really targeting the right type of transactions?195
Should the exchanges be concerned more specifically with foreign issuers?196
Many commentators echoed the concern detailed above that reverse merger
companies have not been the sole participants in fraudulent activity.197 In fact,

191. Id.
192. James R. Doty, Chairman, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 2011 Statesman Dinner
Remarks, Foreign Policy Association (Dec. 6, 2011), http://pcaobus.org/News/Speech/Pages/
12062011_DotyStatesmanDinner .aspx.
193. Letter Comment from James Davidson, Hermes Equity Ownership Servs., to Elizabeth
M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/comments/srnyse-2011-38/nyse201138-1.pdf.
194. See, e.g., Letter Comment from Richard Rappaport, Chief Exec. Officer, WestPark
Capital, Inc., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Sep. 2, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nasdaq-2011073/nasdaq2011073-3.pdf [hereinafter WestPark
Capital Comment] (“The overall effect of the proposed rule change would subject smaller
capitalization issuers to a significantly more burdensome listing requirement that is unrelated to
achievement of the stated objective.”).
195. See Letter Comment from David Feldman, Partner, Richardson & Patel LLP, to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/com
ments/sr-nasdaq-2011-073/nasdaq2011073-1.htm [hereinafter Feldman Comment] (showing
concern that the Chinese IPOs are left out of the regulations and questioning whether targeting
reverse mergers as a category of transactions is the correct solution: “a broad brush application to
all transactions of a particular type may have the chilling effect of discouraging exciting growth
companies from pursuing all available techniques to obtain the benefits of a public listed stock
and greater access to capital while still maintaining appropriate investor protections”).
196. See Letter Comment from Locke Lord LLP, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nasdaq-2011-073/nasdaq2011
073-4.pdf [hereinafter Locke Lord Comment] (suggesting additional listing requirements for
companies controlled by non-U.S. residents).
197. See Feldman Comment, supra note 195 (“Virtually all of these suggestions of
wrongdoing involve Chinese companies that completed reverse mergers. The proposal fails to
note that a number of other Chinese companies that completed full traditional initial public
offerings with major underwriting and accounting firms face the very same allegations. In
addition, many of the Chinese companies facing allegations went public through a reverse merger
followed by a fully underwritten, SEC-reviewed public offering before a single share of stock
traded. So if these allegations turn out to be true, it would not be a result of the manner in which
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one commenting business initiated its own study of corporations that have been
delisted from U.S. stock exchanges, finding that the majority of companies
delisted had actually gone public through IPOs, rather than through reverse
mergers.198
Even more discomforting to many commentators is the fact that reverse
mergers have become an efficient and accepted alternative to the traditional
IPO, and such regulations will clearly thwart the use of reverse merger
transactions.199 One commentator noted that for small businesses, which
generate eighty percent of employment in the United States, reverse mergers
are their only option to gain access to investors.200 For these small businesses,
the traditional IPO is too costly, and it is difficult for such companies to attract
investment banks willing to complete an IPO for a small business.201 Due to
the fact that these regulations will have drastic effects on small capitalization
issuers while failing to target many of the transactions that should be cause for
concern, many commentators feel that the proposed rules overreach and lack
the ability to achieve sufficient investor disclosure and protection.202 Broad
application of the proposed rules to all reverse mergers will subject small
companies to significantly more burdensome listing requirements, thereby

the companies went public.”); see also Letter Comment from David A. Donohoe, Jr., Donohoe
Advisory Assocs. LLC, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 18, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nasdaq-2011073/nasdaq2011073-5.pdf [hereinafter Donohoe
Comment] (“While we recognize that there has been an increase in the number of reverse merger
companies experiencing accounting difficulties, we are also cognizant of the fact that many
companies that have gone public through initial public offerings (‘IPOs’) have also experienced
accounting difficulties.”).
198. Letter Comment from James N. Baxter, Chairman & Gen. Counsel, N.Y. Global Grp.
Inc., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/
comments/sr-nasdaq-2011-073/nasdaq2011073-2.pdf [hereinafter N.Y. Global Comment]
(finding that of twenty-nine China-based companies that were delisted from U.S. exchanges in
2011, fifteen (52%) were IPO companies and twelve (41%) were reverse merger companies).
199. See Donohoe Comment, supra note 197 (“[G]iven that reverse mergers have become an
acceptable and effective alternative to an IPO over the last decade, particularly since it has
become increasingly difficult for companies to attract investment banks willing to complete an
IPO for a small cap issuer and given the large upfront cost associated with an IPO, it is important
to strike a balance so as not to allow the seasoning period to be unnecessarily long and therefore
punitive.”); see also N.Y. Global Comment, supra note 198 (“In many circumstances, reverse
merger is the only available process through which a small U.S. company can raise growth capital
through obtaining a listing on a stock exchange. . . . The reverse merger technique is simply an
economical and rational method for small cap companies to efficiently access the capital
market.”).
200. N.Y. Global Comment, supra note 198.
201. Id.
202. See WestPark Capital Comment, supra note 194.
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discouraging these growing companies from gaining capital market access, all
the while allowing the larger IPO companies to fly under the radar.203
Interestingly, many commentators mentioned that an exception should be
granted for reverse merger companies listing in connection with a firm
commitment underwritten public offering, which essentially provides for the
same level of protection as for an IPO.204 Without a firm commitment, a
reverse merger issuer, unlike an IPO issuer, may not have filed a registration
statement with the SEC and may not have undergone the scrutiny associated
with the underwriting process.205 However, if the reverse merger company has
made a firm commitment underwritten public offering, these differences are
diminished.206
E.

Final Rules of the Exchanges as Approved by the SEC

The SEC approved the proposed rules of both the NYSE and NASDAQ,
along with their amendments.207 Both amendments included an exception for
the “firm commitment underwritten public offering” that many commentators
proposed.208 As explained above, firm commitment essentially makes the
reverse merger more like the IPO.209
IV. GAPS WITHIN THE CURRENT U.S. RESPONSE
Clearly, from the recent depreciation of stocks affiliated with Chinese
companies and the findings of fraud associated with many Chinese firms listed
on U.S. exchanges, investors are in need of protection. As is often the case, as
soon as the market went awry, Americans cried out for more regulation,
questioning why regulators had not prevented the manipulative schemes.210
The SEC, twice delaying its decision date, took over five months to issue a
decision on the NASDAQ rule.211 As for the NYSE rule, the Commission

203. See Feldman Comment, supra note 195.
204. See id.; but see N.Y. Global Comment, supra note 198 (noting that the companies that
were delisted were underwritten and therefore subject to the same amount of scrutiny as an IPO).
205. Donohoe Comment, supra note 197.
206. Id.
207. Approval to the NYSE Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 70,795; Approval to NASDAQ
Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 70,799.
208. Approval to the NYSE Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg at 70,797; Approval to NASDAQ
Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg at 70,801.
209. See supra notes 197–199 and accompanying text.
210. Jenkins, supra note 15.
211. See Notice of Designation of a Longer Period for Commission Action on NASDAQ
Proposed Rule Change, 76 Fed. Reg. 45,636 (July 29, 2011) (extending the forty-five day
decision timeframe to September 12, 2011); see also Approval to NASDAQ Proposed Rule, 76
Fed. Reg at 70,799–801 (stating that NASDAQ filed its proposed rule on May 26, 2011, the
Commission extended the approval date on July 25, 2011, then instituted proceedings on
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delayed once and finally issued an order approving the rule four months after it
was filed.212 Now that the much-anticipated regulation is in place, whether
such regulation is appropriate may be questioned. Although it was quite
necessary to adopt regulations to shield against the issues associated with the
current Chinese reverse merger dilemma in the future, the lag of SEC action
left the market, for a considerable amount of time, to fend for itself.213
Additionally, by failing to address the similar problems investors confront with
Chinese IPOs, the regulation that investors finally received is incomplete.
Within this analysis of the current response of the U.S. government, both
the opposing claims of need for government action and of need for market
freedom will first be analyzed. Then, after a conclusion is made that a mix of
both government action and market scrutiny are necessary since neither is
sufficient on its own, how the regulation should be bolstered to properly
protect investors from the issues that have recently attracted enormous
publicity will be considered.
A.

The Debate Between Pro-Government-Action and Pro-Market-Freedom

On one hand, the pro-government argument is that, in light of the
fraudulent behavior that has been recently revealed, government regulation is
essential to providing investor protection against such activity in the future.
The role of government regulatory agencies, like the SEC, has been described
as delivering a “blend of measures” to create positive externalities and to
“promote good practices in the industry, prevent harms, and provide those
harmed with remedies.”214 In the reverse merger context, the SEC’s approval
of the exchanges’ new rules is essential to promoting truthful financial
practices and reporting, preventing investor harm caused by fraudulent
reporting, and providing investors who have been harmed with remedies. In
fact, due especially to the inability of the PCAOB to perform its inspections of
Chinese firms, this regulation may be the only way to categorically obstruct the
fraudulent activity that has become characteristic of Chinese reverse mergers.

September 12 (as opposed to approving or disapproving the rule), and the Commission approved
the rule on November 8, 2011).
212. See Notice of a Longer Period for Commission Action on the NYSE Proposed Rule
Change, 76 Fed. Reg. 59,756 (Sept. 27, 2011) (stating that the NYSE filed its proposed rule on
July 22, 2011, and extending the forty-five day time period for Commission action); see also
Approval to the NYSE Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg at 70,795 (adopting the final the NYSE rule
on November 8, four months after the NYSE’s July proposal).
213. See Shira Ovide, Uh, Little Late. SEC Warns on Reverse Merger Companies, WALL ST.
J. BLOGS, DEAL J. (June 9, 2011, 12:55 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2011/06/09/uh-little-latesec-warns-on-reverse-merger-companies/ (describing the timing of the SEC’s regulations as
“[c]losing the barn door after the horses got out”).
214. Marcia L. McCormick, Federal Regulation and the Problem of Adjudication, 56 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 39, 39 (2011).
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The failure of the PCAOB to access the internal work of these Chinese
corporations indicates that perhaps the only remedy available to harmed
investors, at least at this time, is the promise of governmental protection
against such harm in the future.
Furthermore, the new rules are necessary as the only ex ante remedy, in the
form of protection, for investors. This regulation is essential to ensure against
similar loss to investors at the point in time when they decide to invest in
reverse merger companies. Although the SEC has also acted by revoking the
registration of dishonest corporations and by initiating enforcement
proceedings against them, these actions are ex post; they fail to prevent the
harm before it is caused by leaving investors unprotected before billions of
dollars’ worth of investments are lost on the market. Moreover, although much
fraudulent activity has been exposed by short sellers and market researchers,
and although many firms are again seeking privatization, it is unknown how
many other companies were still listed on the exchanges prior to the new rules,
with the same fraudulent façade as the ones revealed. The more stringent
listing requirements adopted by the exchanges will at least ensure against the
entry of even more manipulative firms. Additionally, the action by the SEC
provides certainty to investors that authoritative steps, as opposed to those
taken by the market itself, have been taken. This seems especially likely to
promote consumer confidence and encourage investment. It is this certainty
that regulators have acted that will remedy the weakening of consumer trust
due to the simple provision of an ex ante remedy; for investors will fear less
and will be more likely to continue investing because they know they are
protected by legitimate and authoritative action. As will be explained, more
regulation is needed in order to fully solve the problem with Chinese reverse
mergers. When that solution occurs, the promotion of consumer confidence
brought by authoritative steps will be a benefit to the market. Until the problem
is resolved completely, however, it seems that encouraging investment is
undesirable since investors are still susceptible to fraudulent practices.
On the other hand is the cry of those who believe the market must be left
alone, that regulation interferes with the market system. It is market scrutiny
itself, they argue, that exposes and prevents fraud by condemning poor
business behavior through share price deterioration.215 The acts of short sellers
and analysts have brought the faulty practices behind these companies into the
spotlight and, as investors are informed of the true value of these companies,
their share prices diminish. Supportive of the idea that the market can regulate
itself is the fact that the market was actually forced to police itself in this way,
and exhibited some success in doing so, before the SEC approved the proposed
rules of the exchanges. As the SEC delayed decision-making, short sellers

215. Jenkins, supra note 15.
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were productive in researching and exposing fraudulent companies.216 Some
firms, grasping the enormity of the sudden backlash against Chinese
companies, are backing out, seeking privatization through the help of privateequity groups instead.217 It appears that, with the help of short sellers and
private-equity groups, the market did a fair job of tending to itself while new
regulations were awaiting approval. This success supports the argument that
the market can also root out any other existing public companies with similar
accounting issues.
Pro-market advocates could also point to the small companies that many
commentators worried would be overly burdened by the regulation. Such
companies bring to mind the suffering private-company souls, who, though
dying of thirst, were forced to share from a dripping faucet before the
“nobleman-regulator” apathetically stopped the drip forever.218 This analogy
suggests that, like in 2005, the SEC can again be seen as a ruthless agency that
kills off private companies through its regulatory regime over reverse mergers.
As explained above, since private companies are often too small to gain access
to capital, the reverse merger transaction may be the only way for some of
them to grow.219 Thus, by severely restricting access to the markets through
reverse mergers, the SEC (through its exchanges) robs these small firms from
any hope of survival. Assuming the firm commitment underwritten public
offering exception does not have an effect on the practices of small firms,
some market participants may be dissatisfied with allowing such a ruthless
“nobleman-regulator” to kill off those firms, which may possess unanticipated
potential for investors. Lastly, it could be argued that the ruthlessness of such
regulation was unwarranted; the market was showing signs of mending itself
and the less-intrusive action of the SEC—revoking registration and engaging
in enforcement proceedings—was apparently providing a deterrent since SEC
investigations were cited as a cause of the increased privatization plans.220
B.

Both Government Regulation and Market Policing are Necessary to
Protect Investors

Neither government regulation nor market scrutiny is sufficient on its own
to properly protect investors. Even market scrutiny, buttressed by the preregulation use of SEC registration revocation and enforcement proceedings is
inadequate. The conflict between government action and market freedom may
effectively be analyzed by weighing the costs and benefits of one against the
other.

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.D.
Pavkov, supra note 1, at 477.
See supra Part III.D.
See McMahon, supra note 20.
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The benefit of government regulation is clear: it provides the ex ante
remedy to investors as described above.221 Government regulation (through the
exchanges) protects investors before a company can even list on the market,
that is, before the investor-protecting work of short sellers even begins. In
contrast, the benefit of less regulation is the ability of small companies to gain
access to capital markets. Not only is this essential for the survival of some of
these firms, but this ability is also beneficial to society itself because small
businesses, in the aggregate, provide a great amount of employment.222 Also,
these small corporations may have the potential to become superior investment
opportunities and may at some point provide abundant growth for the
economy.
The cost of regulation can be seen as a burden imposed on small American
companies that cannot go public through an IPO and must gain access to
capital markets through the reverse merger process. This cost may completely
bar these companies from gaining access to capital markets and, in turn, from
raising the capital necessary for their survival. Moreover, this cost may be
considered unwarranted by noting that only Chinese reverse mergers have
received rigorous scrutiny for fraudulent behavior, yet Chinese companies
comprise only twenty-five percent of reverse mergers that have listed on U.S.
markets since 2007.223 In contrast, the cost of less regulation is the loss in share
prices to investors that occurs before market scrutiny protects future investors
by flagging the true value of deceitful companies. This, as illustrated above,
has been a tremendous amount of money.224 The cost of allowing the market to
remain less regulated is reduced if it is to be believed that short sellers, market
research firms, and savvy investors do sufficiently investigate these companies
to discover fraudulent behavior. However, the sufficiency of such investigation
is diminished in the Chinese reverse merger context, for the shrewdness of
investors and researchers is hampered by the inability of the PCAOB to inspect
Chinese firms. Without internal inspection, market scrutiny cannot be relied
upon to notify investors when a firm’s reports are fraudulent.
Ultimately, a mix of government action and market scrutiny is appropriate.
Government regulation protects investors before the market has an opportunity
to investigate and respond to fraudulent behavior. Also, government regulation
plays a significant part in protecting investors when the market cannot
adequately investigate listed firms due to access failures. The policing
practices of the market itself, however, are essential in times like the present
when government action is delayed, leaving the market with no other choice

221. See supra Part IV.A.
222. See supra Part III.D.
223. Jessica Holzer, U.S., China to Resume Discussions On Inspections of Chinese Auditors,
WALL ST. J., July 7, 2011, at C3.
224. See supra Part II.D.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2012]

MISSING THE MARK

249

than to flag companies that may be harmful to investors. This is where the
work of short sellers and market research firms act to protect investors who are
left unaided by government action. Moreover, it should be noted that even
outside the reverse merger context, the market will always have a function in
protecting investors. In as much as government rule-making can only employ
broad mandates, it can never fully protect investors. Thus, there will always be
a role for the market in investigating individual companies. Although this
applies outside the reverse merger arena, it is especially true of the present
regulations, which are discussed below.
C. Assuming Government Action Is Essential to Investor Protection, How the
Current Regulation Must Be Improved
Turning to the adequacy of the government regulation itself, there are two
reasons why the regulation is off-target, both of which also illustrate a benefit
of market scrutiny considering the market does not make the same errors. First,
what is clearly worthy of questioning is the failure of the new rules to confront
the problems associated with Chinese IPO companies. If the concern is really
about protecting investors, the adopted regulation is insufficient because it
applies solely to reverse mergers. Although the market itself has flagged both
IPOs and reverse mergers, as evident from the rapid share price declines of
companies that have gone public through both procedures, apparently neither
the exchanges nor the SEC have even considered IPOs. The proposed rules of
the exchanges are off-target by omitting the IPOs that have faced the same
market scrutiny.
Second, it seems more appropriate to adopt more stringent regulations
specific to those companies whose auditing practices cannot be reached by the
PCAOB. This will target the Chinese companies that go public through both
the traditional IPO and the reverse merger. One commentator to the proposed
rules supported this solution by suggesting that more scrutiny against non-U.S.
controlled firms seeking to list on the U.S. market is warranted.225 Enacting
regulations that target all non-U.S. firms will capture the much-criticized
Chinese firms as well as firms from other foreign countries that may hold
similar business practices and pose similar inspection problems as Chinese
firms.226 Such regulation is appropriate because the alternative is to allow
Chinese companies and perhaps other foreign companies to commit defective
accounting and manipulation of financial statements. While these companies
refuse to allow the agencies associated with the markets on which they list to

225. See Locke Lord Comment, supra note 196 (suggesting additional listing requirements
for companies controlled by non-U.S. residents).
226. See Doty, supra note 109 (noting the benefits of joint inspections as an efficient means
of overseeing the auditing of foreign publicly-traded corporations, and that the PCAOB has joint
oversight with nine countries).
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investigate them, the other listed companies are subject to inspection by the
PCAOB and must abide by the rules. It seems even more proper when one
notes that Chinese companies have been “aiming” their fraudulent behavior at
American investors. Perhaps even more likely to hush protest against such a
regulatory scheme is the fact that Chinese corporations do not dare commit
such fraud in their own country because they know the severity of the
consequences. Instead, they turn to the American market to employ their
manipulative schemes. Again, the market does not commit this error, for while
government regulation fails to target specifically Chinese or particularly nonU.S. stocks, the market does not.227
CONCLUSION
After much delay and much debate, the SEC’s final rules adopting more
stringent listing requirements for reverse merger companies seeking to list on
NASDAQ and the NYSE are in place. Although the SEC did approve
amendments excepting from the requirements those reverse merger companies
listing in connection with a firm commitment underwritten public offering, the
rules failed to address concerns that must be resolved in order to adequately
protect investors: the inability to retain auditing oversight of companies in
China and the skepticism that has recently plagued Chinese IPOs for the same
reasons that reverse mergers have gained attention. If the goal of regulation is
the greatest possible protection of investors, that goal has not yet been
achieved. Only by imposing more requirements on non-U.S. companies,
regardless of the manner through which they went public, will investors be
adequately protected against the fraudulent behavior that was first exposed by
Chinese reverse mergers.
Although the reverse merger issue illustrates the recurring dynamic
between market policing and government regulation, it is essential to note that
both have been and are required to be in place in order to provide investor
protection against reverse merger securities. While the market has provided
great protection through the work of short sellers, research analysts, and the
price indicators of the market itself, in the current situation the market is
insufficient to provide full protection. Because there is no system that monitors
the accuracy of the financial statements of a great number of reverse mergers,
government regulation that creates a barrier against such companies listing on
U.S. exchanges is essential. Only through government regulation can investors
be assured that authoritative bars against the current fraudulent practices are in
place and that market activists have not failed to flag problematic securities
due to their inability, and the inability of regulators in both the United States
and China, to tap the true financial character of listed companies. On the other

227. Fletcher & McMahon, supra note 150.
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hand, market scrutiny was particularly important during the recent regulatory
proceedings due to the incessant delay of regulators. While investors waited
for a final rule, the market was working to mend itself by researching
companies and deteriorating the value of the fraudulently behaving ones.
How effective the final regulation will be in complementing market
scrutiny is left to be seen. As a result of the rules leaving gaping holes in
regulation through their omission of increased regulation of all Chinese
companies, including IPOs, the attention of investors must now be turned to
the PCAOB and its efforts to obtain stricter oversight of Chinese audits.
Unfortunately, the PCAOB’s negotiations with China are likely to be
hampered by the inability of either country to gain oversight of Chinese firms
and their auditors. It is this inability for the PCAOB to obtain oversight that
exacerbates the need for stricter exchange rules. While Chinese IPOs are left
undisturbed by the regulatory hand and oversight by the PCAOB is lacking,
investors are not adequately protected. Assuming the PCAOB continues to
meet resistance in its efforts to obtain joint oversight in China, the market will
be forced to continue to fill the major gaps left by the new regulation until
legislation that more fully addresses the problem is in place. Until such joint
inspection is acquired, or until the SEC approves more comprehensive rules,
encouraging investment will continue the trend of shareholder devastation, for
investors will continue to be susceptible to fraudulent practices.
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